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ARGUMENT 
The arguments in this Reply Brief are limited to the new matters raised by 
Defendants Samuel B. Peebles ("Sam Peebles") and Harold Peebles (together the 
"Peebles") in their Brief. The arguments herein are numbered in response to the 
appropriate sections of the Peebles' Brief to aid the Court in reviewing the issues 
raised. 
I.A.1 Brookside's Lease With Richard Rowley, and the Peebles' 
Consent Thereto. Constituted Surrender and Acceptance of any 
Lease Between Brookside and Sam Peebles. 
(a) The Peebles Surrendered the Premises. 
In their brief the Peebles argue that because their mobile home remained on 
space #100, they did not surrender space #100 to Brookside. (Brief of Appellees 
at page 20.) This bald, conclusory assertion is not consistent with the facts that the 
Peebles sold the mobile home to several different individuals. (Deposition of Sam 
Peebles at 13, 16, and 20.) At the time of Brookside's purchase of the park, the 
Peebles had rented the mobile home to Richard Rowley with an option to purchase 
and knew that Mr. Rowley entered into a lease for space #100 directly with 
Brookside. (Deposition of Sam Peebles at 20-22; T. 183-84.) Such actions by Sam 
Peebles constitute a surrender of space #100 because tenancies superior to that 
of Sam Peebles existed regarding both the mobile home and space #100. 
(b) The Peebles Intended to Surrender the Premises. 
In their brief the Peebles argue that they had no intent to surrender space 
#100 to Brookside. (Brief of Appellees at pages 20-22.) As noted above, the 
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Peebles' actions in selling their mobile home to various individuals, in renting their 
mobile home to Richard Rowley with an option to purchase, and consenting to Mr. 
Rowley and the other purchasers to enter into direct leases with Brookside for space 
#100 objectively demonstrate the Peebles' intent to surrender space #100. 
(Deposition of Sam Peebles at 13-22; T. 183-184.) The Peebles' arguments that 
they did not intend to surrender space #100 highlight the policy reasons for 
disallowing a party to contradict deposition testimony with self-serving affidavits in 
order to create an issue of fact. 
Whether the Peebles realized the full legal ramifications of surrendering 
space #100 is irrelevant as to whether the Peebles surrendered space #100. 
Though it may have been practice for Brookside's predecessor to enter into two 
leases for the same space, such a practice is irrelevant regarding Brookside given 
that it did not engage in such a practice. (R. at 771.) A subsequent lease would 
replace the initial lease under the doctrine of surrender as a matter of law. Reid v. 
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989). 
The Peebles' actions in selling the mobile home, renting it to Richard Rowley 
with an option to purchase, consenting to Mr. Rowley and other purchasers to enter 
into direct leases with Brookside for space #100, and Sam Peebles' refusal to enter 
into leases with Brookside objectively demonstrate their intent to surrender space 
#100 and bald statements to the contrary are not sufficient to counter such a 
conclusion. (Deposition of Sam Peebles at 20-22; T. 183-184.) 
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(c) Brookside Accepted the Peebles' Surrender of the Premises 
In their brief the Peebles argue that Brookside did not accept the Peebles' 
surrender of space #100. (Brief of Appellees at pages 22-24.) However, Brookside 
accepted the Peebles's surrender of space #100 when it entered into a new lease 
with Richard Rowley. (R. at 414-15.) Brookside looked to the Peebles as 
lienholders for payment of rent when Mr. Rowley defaulted on his lease with 
Brookside because the Peebles' mobile home remained on the property. (R. at 
415.) 
Pursuant to the Mobile Home Park Residency Act, the Peebles became 
lienholders regarding the trailer located on space #100 rather than residents. Utah 
Code Annotated § 57-16-9. "[T]he lienholder of record of a mobile home is primarily 
liable to the mobile home park owner or operator for rent." i d The Peebles had to 
either remove the mobile home or commence paying rent for space #100. (R. at 
415.) Brookside did not seek payment of rent from Sam Peebles under a previous 
lease with Brookside. (R. at 415-16.) Brookside's notices to the Peebles indicated 
that Brookside considered the mobile home abandoned and Peebles lienholders 
that "are primarily liable to the Brookside Mobile Home Park for all rent." (R. at 432.) 
The right to tenancy of Mr. Rowley in space #100 was inconsistent with the Peebles 
having a right to tenancy and Brookside's execution of the Rowley lease was an 
acceptance of Sam Peebles' surrender of space #100. 
In their brief, the Peebles claim that Brookside miscited 49 Am. Jur. 2d 
Landlord and Tenant Section 252 (1995) for the proposition that Sam Peebles' 
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assent to the Rowley lease is sufficient to create a surrender and acceptance of 
space #100. The Peebles included an initial line to the quote used by Brookside to 
support their interpretation of the passage that such an assent is only a surrender 
upon the execution of a lease between the same tenant and landlord. However, the 
line following the original quote used by Brookside further clarifies the statement and 
demonstrates that the quote fully supports Brookside's proposition. The original 
quote along with both the previous and following lines reads as follows: 
There is a presumption that acceptance by the tenant of a new lease 
of the premises during the term of an old lease operates as a surrender 
of the old lease by the act of the parties; that is a surrender of a lease 
is implied by law when another estate is created by the reversioner or 
remainderman, with the assent of the tenant, that is incompatible with 
the existing term. Thus, as a general rule, when a new lease of the 
premises is taken by the lessee from the lessor for the whole or a part 
of the term embraced in the former one, there is said to be a surrender 
in law because the giving of a new lease necessarily implies a 
surrender of the old one. It is not necessary that the second lease be 
given to the first lessee: if it is given to a third person with the consent 
of the first lessee, accompanied with the possession, it is equally 
operative as a surrender. 
49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 252 (1995) (emphasis added). 
I.A.2 Jury Verdict is Irrelevant for Purposes of Reviewing Granting of 
Motion to Reconsider 
In their brief, the Peebles argue that Sam Peebles's Affidavit does not conflict 
with his prior sworn statement and that such argument was validated by the jury 
verdict that Sam Peebles' had not surrendered his lease. (Brief of Appellees at 
page 24.) The jury verdict regarding Sam Peebles' surrender of his lease is 
irrelevant because Brookside's appeal concerns the trial court's granting of the 
Peebles Motion for Reconsideration overturning its previous grant of summary 
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judgment to Brookside. The issue of whether Sam Peebles surrendered his lease 
is a mixed fact and legal question in which this court must determine whether the 
"given set of facts come within the reach of a given rule of law." State v. Pena. 869 
P.2d 932, 936-37 (Utah 1994). In reviewing the summary judgment portion of this 
action, this court may "determine the legal effect of specific facts." \± at 937. 
I.A.3 Brookside Made a Prima Facie Case for Unlawful Detainer 
In their brief, the Peebles raise the argument that Brookside failed to make 
a prima facie case of Unlawful Detainer at the summary judgment stage of this 
action without providing any detail and blending the argument with issues occurring 
at the trial stage of the proceedings. (Brief of Appellees at 25 and 33-39.) 
The Peebles have failed to preserve this issue for review on appeal. "When 
there is no indication in the record on appeal that the trial court reached or ruled on 
an issue, this court will not undertake to consider the issue on appeal." Estate of 
Morrison. 933 P.2d 1015,1018 (Utah App. 1997). The Peebles failed to raise this 
issue at the summary judgment or trial phase of the proceedings and therefore 
have not preserved this issue and it cannot be heard at this time. In order to 
reserve an issue on appeal, the trial court must have an "opportunity to consider" 
the arguments raised on appeal. JcL The Peebles failed to raise this issue at the 
motion summary judgment phase of this matter and it is therefore barred on appeal. 
Even if the Peebles have preserved the issue of proper service under 
Unlawful Detainer, the record at the summary judgment phase indicates that 
Brookside complied with the requirements of the Utah Code regarding unlawful 
C \ I I A\OtJUD\D<kj>hiac\ranluhriaf u/nrl W 
detainer. Pursuant to the Unlawful Detainer Act, a tenant of real property is guilty 
of unlawful detainer "when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with 
monthly or other period rent reserved . . . [ , ] in case of tenancies at will, where he 
remains in possession of the premises after the expiration of a notice not less than 
five days." Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3(b). If a person of suitable age or discretion 
cannot be found at the place of residence, then notice may be served "by affixing 
a copy in a conspicuous place on the leased property." Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-
6(2)(b). 
The Peebles liability for rent to Brookside arose from the Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act which states "the lienholder of record of a mobile home is primarily 
liable to the mobile home park owner or operator for rent." Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-
9. Because the Peebles' liability is created by statute, such a tenancy should be 
deemed a tenancy at will, rather than a month to month tenancy, because there was 
no agreement between the parties, either verbal or written, creating the tenancy. 
After service on the Peebles of notice of their duty to pay rent as lienholders, the 
Peebles made sporadic payments and were in default at the time Brookside served 
notice of unlawful detainer. (R. at 415-418.) The Peebles sporadic payment of rent 
was in compliance with a statutory mandate and should not be deemed to create 
a tenancy beyond a tenancy at will. 
Brookside served the Peebles with a five-day notice by posting the same on 
the trailer pursuant to the affidavit of service executed by Constable William L. Mciff. 
(R. at 65-66.) The Peebles themselves indicate that the mobile home was vacant 
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at the time of the posting. (Appellees' Brief at page 37.) Such service by posting 
was therefore proper because there would not have been "a person of suitable are 
or discretion" at the mobile home with whom to leave a copy. Utah Code Ann. § 78-
36-3. 
The Peebles argue that Brookside should have attempted to serve the 
Peebles at their places of residence and, if no person of suitable age or discretion 
was available, then posting at the mobile home. Given the intent of the statute and 
wording of the entire statute, it is clear that "the place of residence" to be served is 
the same location as "the leased property." Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-6(2). It should 
also be noted that Constable Mciff also indicated in his affidavit that he mailed 
copies of the notices to the Peebles at the addresses "12067 South 2240 West 
Riverton, Utah 84065, and also 12668 So, 2360 West Riverston 84065." (R. at 66.) 
At trial, the trial court did not allow the admission of the affidavit of service 
because Constable Mciff was deceased before this matter went to trial and was 
therefore unavailable for cross examination. (T. at 138.) However, under Utah law 
a "constable's Affidavit of Service is prima facie evidence of proper service of 
process and is deemed presumptively correct." Classic Cabinets. Inc. v. All 
American Life Ins. Co.. 978 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah 1999). The burden shifts to the 
party opposing the affidavit to show the "invalidity or absence of service of process 
. . . by clear and convincing evidence." id.- (citations omitted) Because the trial 
court erroneously refused to admit into evidence the affidavit of service of process, 
the record at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings was different than the 
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record at trial. Such ruling by the trial court was incorrect pursuant to Classic 
Cabinet, and reversible by this Court. 
I.B.1 Brookside was a Bona Fide Purchaser 
In their brief, the Peebles argue that due to their mobile home being located 
on space #100 at the time of Brookside's purchase of the park, Brookside had 
constructive notice of Sam Peebles interest in space #100. (Brief of Appellees at 
page 26.) However, on the rent roll attached to the Purchase Agreement, Richard 
Rowley was noted as the tenant of space #100. (R. 298.) Given that a lease with 
Rowley did exist, Brookside did not have constructive notice that the mobile home 
was owned by the Peebles. (R. 302.) The Peebles also cite Latses v. Nick Floor. 
Inc.. 99 Utah 214, 104 P.2d 619 (Utah 1940) for the proposition that a grantee's 
position is no stronger than the grantor's. In Latses. the grantee did not meet its 
burden to investigate the tenants of the premises and the terms of such contractual 
relations, i d at 622. In this matter, Brookside has met its duty to inquire, by 
obtaining a rent roll which lists Rowley as the lessee of space #100, reviewing the 
terms of the actual lease the park had with Rowley, and confirming that Rowley 
occupied space #100. (R. at 409, 414-15.) 
I.B.2 Brookside did not Assume the Sam Peebles Lease 
In their brief the Peebles argue that Brookside assumed all leases and 
agreements appurtenant to the Park when it purchased the Park pursuant to the 
terms of the Assignment. (Brief of Appellees at page 26.) The Peebles thus argue 
that Brookside therefore assumed the Sam Peebles lease though it is not listed on 
E \JLA\BMHP\Pwbles\replybnef wpd -8-
the rent roll attachment to the Assignment. (Brief of Appellees at 26.) In making 
this argument, Peebles have mischaracterized the language of the Assignment by 
quoting only a portion of it out of context. The language of the Assignment limits 
the leases being assumed to those listed on the rent roll. The relevant language of 
the Assignment states that Brookside was assigned: 
right, title, and interest in and to those certain leases, rental 
agreements, security or other deposits from tenants, and rentals with 
respect to such leases and agreements appurtenant to the Property, 
except as provided herein (hereinafter collectively referred to the 
'Leases'), which Leases, rents, and security deposits are more 
particularly described on Exhibit 'B' attached hereto and incorporated 
herein by this reference. 
(R. 293.) The rent roll limits the leases being assumed by Brookside which listed 
only "Rowley" as the tenant of space #100. (R. 298.) 
I.B.3 The Bona Fide Purchaser Rule is not Preempted by the Mobile 
Home Park Residency Act 
In their brief, the Peebles argue that the Mobile Home Park Residency Act 
preempts the bona fide purchaser rule. (Brief of Appellees at pages 27-28.) In 
support of this argument, the Peebles cite Section 57-16-4(1) of the Mobile Home 
Park Residency Act which states that "a mobile home park or its agents may not 
terminate a lease or rental agreement upon any grounds other than as specified in 
this chapter." This provision however, does not address how a purchaser is to be 
placed on notice of silent leases and what effect, if any, they would have on a bona 
fide purchaser. Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-3-2 and 57-3-3 suggests that without actual 
or constructive notice, the lease is void as to Brookside. As found by the trial court 
in granting Brookside's motion for summary judgment, and later held by the jury, 
there was no written lease between Brookside and Sam Peebles. The Act 
specifically requires that "[e]ach agreement for the lease of mobile home space shall 
be written and signed." Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-4(2). There was no "lease or 
rental agreement" being terminated by Brookside, the Peebles had the role of a 
lender or lienholder, the Act does not apply, and Brookside was compelled to pursue 
an unlawful detainer action against the Peebles. 
Furthermore, in order for the Peebles to receive the benefits of the Mobile 
Home Park Residency Act they must meet the requirements of the Act. Sam 
Peebles refused to sign a written lease with Brookside, as required by the Act. 
(Deposition of Sam Peebles at 36-37.) Because the Peebles did not comply with 
the Act by refusing to sign a written lease they have chosen to not obtain the 
benefits provided by the Act. 
I.B.4 Brookside Made a Prima Facie Case Under the Unlawful Detainer 
Act 
Please see Brookside's arguments presented in Section I.A.3 beginning on 
page 5 of this brief. 
I.B.5 Brookside's Claim of Unlawful Detainer is not Moot 
In their brief the Peebles argue that Brookside's claim of unlawful detainer is 
moot because the Peebles vacated space #100 and paid Brookside all unpaid rent 
while this action was pending. (Brief of Appellees at page 29.) However, the 
Peebles paid the rent to Brookside under a stipulation made in open court on 
December 4, 1996, that "Brookside Mobile Home Park will negotiate the checks 
tendered by Mr. Peebles for monthly rent without prejudice to the rights of the 
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parties." (Letter from Brooksides' counsel to Peebles' counsel dated December 4, 
1996 a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". Also 
attached hereto as Exhibits "B" and "C" are true and correct copies of letters dated 
January 8, 1997, and May 29, 1997, further confirming the stipulation.) Pursuant 
to the terms of the stipulation, Brookside cannot be prejudiced in this action by the 
Peebles' payment of rent. 
Even if the stipulation had not been entered into, payment of back rent after 
the commencement of an unlawful detainer and vacation are not sufficient to render 
a cause of action for unlawful detainer moot. Unlawful detainer commences upon 
service of notice of the same. Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3. The property owner 
recovers damages for its lack of access to the property during the unlawful detainer 
period which is then trebled. Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10. Contrary to the 
arguments of the Peebles, "rent" is not the recovery provided by unlawful detainer. 
The plaintiff in an unlawful detainer action "is entitled to recover such damages as 
are the natural and proximate consequences of the unlawful detainer." Forrester v. 
Cook. 292 P. 206,214, 77 Utah 137 (1930). "While damages may not be restricted 
to the rental value and may include more, yet the rental value during the unlawful 
withholding of possession is the minimum of damages." JcL "After the tenancy has 
been terminated by the notice required by the statute, the person in unlawful 
possession is not owing rent under the contract, but must respond in damages 
pursuant to the law." ]a\ The Peebles tender of rent is not satisfaction of unlawful 
detainer, their continued possession of space #100 is the basis of the action. To 
allow a party to vacate premises days before a trial regarding unlawful detainer and 
render the matter moot, as happened in this case, would defeat the purposes of 
unlawful detainer. The payment of back rent should be applied against the 
judgment amount due Brookside after calculation and trebling of Brookside's 
damages pursuant to Utah statute. 
(a) The Section 57-16-8 "Safe Harbor" is Inapplicable to Evictions 
Brought Under Unlawful Detainer 
The Peebles cite Section 57-16-8 of the Mobile Home Park Residency Act as 
creating a safe harbor from imposition of treble damages for Unlawful Detainer. 
(Brief of Appellees at pages 29-30.) Section 57-16-8 of the Act does not refer to 
Unlawful Detainer and is therefore limited to evictions brought under the Mobile 
Home Park Residency Act. Also, the Peebles refused to sign a written lease, as 
required by the Mobile Home Park Residency Act, and therefore should be denied 
the benefits of the Act. (Deposition of Sam Peebles at 36-37.) 
(b) Treble Damages are Warranted in This Matter for Unlawful 
Detainer 
In their brief the Peebles argue that because they have vacated space #100 
and paid rents due while this action was pending, Brookside has not suffered 
damages under Section 78-36-10 of Utah Code Annotated regarding Unlawful 
Detainer and therefore there are no damages to be trebled for unlawful detainer. 
(Brief of Appellees at pages 30-31.) Even though the Peebles vacated the lot and 
paid rents due during the pendency of this matter, as argued above in section I.B.5 
commencing on page 10, Brookside has suffered damages caused by the Peebles 
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failure to vacate the premises. Such damages do not disappear upon payment of 
past rent. Rents paid by the Peebles should offset the damages suffered by 
Brookside once they have been determined by the court. This Court should remand 
this matter for determination of the amount of damages suffered by Brookside due 
to the Peebles unlawful detainer which would be trebled pursuant to Unlawful 
Detainer. 
I.C(a) Waiver and Estoppel is not a Basis for Granting the 
Peebles' Motion to Reconsider 
In their brief the Peebles argue that an independent basis to uphold the trial 
court's grant of their Motion to Reconsider is waiver and estoppel due to Brookside's 
acceptance of rental payments. (Brief of Appellees at page 32.) However, the 
Peebles payment of rent was as a lienholder of the mobile home who has a primary 
obligation for payment of rent to Brookside. Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-9. 
Also, Brookside gave notice to the Peebles to vacate the premises as 
lienholder of the trailer. (R. at 432.) Any payment of rent was as a lienholder as 
provided under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act. 
I.C(b) Law of the Case Does not Apply to the Trial Court's 
Granting of Brookside's Motion for Summary Judgment 
In their brief the Peebles argue that the trial court was barred under the 
doctrine of the law of the case from granting Brookside's Motion for Summary 
Judgment when an earlier Motion for Summary Judgment by Brookside had been 
denied. (Brief of Appellees at page 32.) The Peebles have first brought this 
_ o _ ( _ . 1 3 _ 
argument on appeal. It has therefore not been preserved below and is barred. 
Estate of Morrison. 933 P.2d 1015 (Utah App. 1997). 
As noted in the case cited by the Peebles in their brief, "any judge is free to 
change his or her mind on the outcome of a case until a decision is formally 
rendered." Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors. Inc.. 761 P.2d 42,45 (Utah 
App. 1988) (citations omitted). Although a trial court is not bound by its own 
precedents, "prior relevant rulings made in the same case are generally to be 
followed." \± (citations omitted). The "law of the case" doctrine is most applicable 
regarding motions for summary judgment when "a subsequent motion fails to 
present the case in a different light, such as when no new, material evidence is 
introduced." lg\ (citations omitted). 
In this matter, significant discovery had occurred after Brookside's initial 
motion for summary judgment. Brookside introduced new material evidence in the 
form of deposition testimony which supported its second motion for summary 
judgment and persuaded the court to grant the same. If applicable in this matter, 
the "law of the case" doctrine would bar the Peebles' Motion for Reconsideration, 
a motion not recognized under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and involving 
repetitious contentions of the issues of this case. 
II.A The Unlawful Detainer Act Applies to Brookside's 
Eviction Action Rather than the Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act 
In their brief the Peebles argue that the Mobile Home Park Residency Act 
applies to Brookside's eviction proceeding because Sam Peebles was a resident 
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of the Park without addressing the fact that Sam Peebles did not reside in the Park 
and there was no written lease between the Peebles and Brookside as required by 
the Act. (Brief of Appellees at pages 34-35.) Under the Peebles' interpretation of 
the Act, a mobile home park owner would never be able to pursue an action of 
unlawful detainer if the party in unlawful detainer (lienholder or holding a status 
other than a Resident) had at some point in time made a rent payment with or 
without a written lease though the Act requires such leases to be in writing. 
In addition, the plain language of the Act allows a park owner to elect to 
pursue an eviction proceeding solely under the Act or to simultaneously pursue a 
claim for unlawful detainer. Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-15.1. Section 57-16-15.1 of 
the Mobile Home Park Residency Act sets forth the procedural and remedy 
differences between proceedings "where a landlord elects to bring an action under 
this chapter and not under the unlawful detainer provisions" and proceedings "in 
which the mobile home park has elected to treat as actions also brought under the 
unlawful detainer provisions." (emphasis added). Section 57-16-15.1 allows for 
election of unlawful detainer remedies where behavior by a resident endangers the 
security of other residents and for nonpayment of rent. 
II.B Peebles Were Tenants at Will 
Please see Brookside's arguments regarding this issue in Section 1.A.3 
hereinabove commencing on page 5. 
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II.C Proof of Service was Improperly Excluded from Evidence at Trial 
Please see Brookside's arguments regarding this issue in Section 1.A.3 
hereinabove commencing on page 5. 
II.D The Jury Found That no Written Lease Existed Between 
Brookside and the Peebles. 
In their brief the Peebles misrepresent the holdings of the jury claiming that 
because the jury found that Sam Peebles had a written lease with Brookside's 
predecessor and Sam Peebles had not surrendered the same, Brookside had to 
comply with the Mobile Home Park Residency Act in terminating such written lease. 
(Brief of Appellees at page 38.) However, the jury Interrogatory following those 
cited by the Peebles, indicates that the jury specifically found that Brookside had not 
assumed the Sam Peebles written lease. (R. 920.) The jury therefore found that 
no written lease existed between Brookside and the Peebles and the Peebles' 
arguments to the contrary are a misrepresentation to this Court. 
II.E.1 Harold Peebles was Properly Served 
Please see Brookside's arguments regarding this issue in Section 1.A.3 
hereinabove commencing on page 5. 
II.E.2 Harold Peebles was Wrongly Dismissed by the Trial Court 
In their brief the Peebles claim that Brookside did not dispute in its brief 
Harold Peebles dismissal by the trial court. (Brief of Appellees at page 39.) 
However, Brookside briefed this issue on page 22 of its initial brief. Please also 
note that pursuant to Section 57-16-9 of the Mobile Home Park Residency Act, 
Harold Peebles' liability arises from his status as a lienholder regarding the trailer. 
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Despite the trial court's ruling to the contrary, Harold Peebles' liability arose from his 
ownership of the trailer and his refusal to vacate the premises despite demands 
from Brookside. 
III. The Jury's Verdict Should be Upheld Regarding the Peebles' 
Counterclaim of Unreasonableness Under the Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act 
In their brief the Peebles argue that the jury verdict that Brookside's rejection 
of Ms. Southworth's application was reasonable under the Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act was in error and should be overturned by this Court. In reviewing 
such a challenge, this Court reviews the sufficiency of all evidence "in the light most 
favorable to the verdict." Child v. Gonda. 972 P.2d 425,433 (Utah 1999) (citations 
omitted). "So long as some evidence and reasonable inferences support the jury's 
findings," the appellate court will not disturb them. Ja\ The verdict will only be 
reversed if "the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so 
slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." 
\± In order to allow this Court to conduct a meaningful and expedient review of the 
evidence, the challenging party "must marshal all the evidence in support of the 
findings." Robb v. Anderton. 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Ut. Ct App. 1993). In 
marshaling the evidence, the challenging party "must present, in comprehensive 
and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial." Moon 
v. Moon. 973 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). If the challenging party fails to 
properly marshal the evidence, the appellate court must affirm the findings below. 
Robb at 1328. 
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The Peebles in this matter have failed to marshal the evidence supporting the 
jury verdict. (Brief of Appellees at pages 39-46.) Instead, they merely reargue the 
same case made before the trial court presenting selected facts and excerpts of trial 
testimony in support of their position. The Peebles cite only two pages of the trial 
transcript regarding evidence supporting the jury's verdict and then do not present 
such testimony verbatim, as they do with testimony supporting their position, but 
summarize it in a way to give the impression such testimony supports their 
arguments. (Brief of Appellees at 43.) 
A cursory review of the trial transcript demonstrates evidence in support of the 
jury verdict that was not marshaled by the Peebles. In the testimony of Ms. 
Southworth, she acknowledged that her credit report from Western Reporting states 
that Western Reporting was unable to verify her employment though the 
employment was at a company she owned. (T. 306-07.) In so doing, Ms. 
Southworth testified as follows: 
Q. And if you look down at the employment section on page two of that, 
see the employment there? It says that you're employed at Utah 
Academy? 
A. Professional Dental Assistance, yes, I am. 
Q. It doesn't say that, does it? It just says employed Utah Academy. 
A. That's what the Western is, or Western Reporting put down, as far as 
the income. 
Q. You've answered my question. 
A. Sorry. 
Q. Let me ask you the next question. 
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A. Yes. 
Q. There's also a comment there that says unable to verify. Do you see 
that? Do you see that? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Did you ever get a call from Western Reporting seeking to verify how 
you were employed or whether it was self employment? 
A. No, I did not, not that I received myself. One of my staff members may 
have. 
(T. 306-07.) 
Ms. Southworth also acknowledged that her credit report from Western 
Reporting indicate that Western Reporting was unable to verify her account at Utah 
First Credit. (T. 307-308.) In so doing, Ms. Southworth testified as follows: 
Q. Okay. Look up at the language above that where it says bank 
summary. 
A. Financial? 
Q. Un-huh. Bank — well, just above it says bank summary? 
A. Okay. 
Q. You see that whole box right there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It says bank, Utah First Credit, you see that language? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it says later, down, comment: Would not verify information over 
phone. Do you see that? 
A. Right. 
Q. Did anyone ever tell you that the credit bureau was unable to verify 
information at Utah First Credit? 
A. I would not allow any of my banks, or personal to verify anything to 
anyone without okay from me. 
(T. 307-08.) 
In addition, though Ms. Southworth claims to have approached Mr. Prentice 
with her tax returns and financial information regarding her application to Brookside, 
Mr. Prentice testified that he did not see that she had tax returns or other financial 
information with her when Ms. Southworth came to the Brookside office. (T. 616.) 
The Peebles did not tender Ms. Southworth's tax returns into evidence to rebut 
Brookside's basis for denying her application and so the issues has not been 
preserved on appeal. Estate of Morrison. 933 P.2d 1015 (Utah App. 1997). 
Because the Peebles have failed to properly marshal the evidence, the jury's 
findings should be affirmed. Furthermore, the evidence noted above of Ms. 
Southworth's credit report indicating that the credit agency was unable to verify her 
employment or bank account is sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that 
Brookside's rejection of her application as a tenant to be reasonable. The Peebles 
did not tender Ms. Southworth's tax returns into evidence and have therefore not 
preserved on appeal the issues of whether her credit was sufficient. 
IV. and V. Brookside Should be Awarded Attorneys' Fees and Costs 
In their brief the Peebles first argue in section IV of their brief that Brookside 
is not entitled to recovery of attorney's fees in defending against the Peebles 
counterclaim under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act because Brookside's 
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eviction proceeded under the Unlawful Detainer Act. (Brief of Appellees at pages 
46-50.) The Peebles then argue the opposite in section V of their brief that even 
though Brookside proceeded to evict the Peebles under the Unlawful Detainer Act, 
dismissal of such claim by the trial court results in recovery of their attorney's fees 
under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act. (Brief of Appellees at pages 51 -52.) 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Brookside respectfully requests that this Court 
reinstate the summary judgment of the trial court, determine Brookside has 
prevailed on its cause of action against the Peebles for unlawful detainer, remand 
this matter to the trial court for calculation of appropriate treble damages under the 
applicable statute, and award Brookside Attorneys' fees and costs due under the 
Mobile Home Park Residency Act due to Brookside prevailing against the Peebles 
regarding the Peebles' claims under the Act. 
DATED th is^day of June, 2000: 
\ 
'y?n-io*- /<77Z 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
POOLE, SULLIVAN & ADAMS, L.C. 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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Tab A 
DENNIS K POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
DENNIS K. POOLE, P.C. 
ANDREA NUFFER GODFREY 
December 4, 1996 
4543 SOUTH 700 EAST, SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107 
TELEPHONE (801) 263-33-44 
TELECOPIER (801) 263-1010 
Mr. Russell A. Cline 
CRIPPEN & CLINE 
310 South Main, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Sam Peebles 
Dear Mr. Cline: 
This letter will confirm the stipulation made in Court this 
date that Brookside Mobile Home Park will negotiate the checks 
tendered by Mr. Peebles for monthly rent without prejudice to the 
rights of the parties. 
I am enclosing herewith for your reference copies of the 
checks which we have been holding and which we are forwarding to 
Brookside to deposit. You should be aware that as of December 1, 
1996 a total of $2,115.00 is due and owing for rent. After 
applying the checks we are holding, which total $1,370.00, there is 
a balance of $745.00. Unless we receive this amount in full within 
the next ten (10) days, we will file a Motion for Summary Judgment 
based upon the failure to pay the lot rental. 
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
DKP:ec 
Enc. 
cc: Brookside Mobile Home Park, w/checks 
ciln.J.LT* (dkp) 
TabB 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
DENNIS K. POOLE, P.C. 4543 SOUTH 700 EAST, SUITE 200 
ANDREA NUFFER SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107 
TELEPHONE (801) 263-3344 
TELECOPIER (801) 263-1010 
January 8, 1997 
VIA TELEFAX - 322-1054 
AND REGULAR MAIL 
Russell A. Cline, Esq. 
Crippen & Cline, L.C. 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Brookside Mobile Home Park 
Vs: Sam Peebles, et al 
Dear Mr. Cline: 
We have been advised by our client that Mr. Peebles has left 
in their office a check in the amount of $1,000.00 to cover the 
past due rent as well as the monthly rental payment for January 
1997. This letter will confirm that we are advising our client to 
negotiate this check and any future payments made by Mr. Peebles 
pending the outcome of this litigation, should we choose to accept 
them, based upon the stipulation made in Court on December 4, 1996, 
to the effect that Brookside Mobile Home Park will negotiate the 
checks tendered by Mr. Peebles for monthly rent without prejudice 
to the rights of the parties. 
I am enclosing herewith for your reference a copy of the 
check. We will advise our client to hold the check until January 
13, 1997, before depositing the same in the event you are not 
agreeable to this procedure. 
Should you have any questions or objections regarding 
acceptance of this check, please advise before January 13th. 
truly yo 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
DKP:ec 
Enc. 
c c : Brooks ide Mobile Home Park 
TabC 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
DENNIS K. POOLE, P.C. 4543 SOUTH 700 EAST, SUITE 200 
ANDREA NUFFER SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107 
TELEPHONE (801) 263-3344 
TELECOPIER (801) 263-1010 
May 29, 1997 
VIA TELEFAX - 322-1054 
Russell A. Cline, Esq. 
Crippen & Cline, L.C. 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Brookside Mobile Home Park 
Vs: Sam Peebles, et al 
Dear Mr. Cline; 
We have been advised by our client that Mr. Peebles has left 
a message on the answering machine in their office requesting the 
amount owing for rental payments now due inasmuch as he is desirous 
of bringing the payments current. Will you please advise Mr. 
Peebles that the following amounts are now due: 
March 1997 $ 265.00 
April 1997 $ 285.00 
May 1997 $ 285.00 
June 199 7 $ 255.00 
Total $ 1,090.00 
The payments for March, April and May include a $30.00 late charge. 
If the payment is made after June 5th, there will be an additional 
late charge due on the June payment. 
This letter will confirm that any payments made by Mr. Peebles 
pending the outcome of this litigation, are based upon the stipula-
tion made in Court on December 4, 1996, to the effect that Brook-
side Mobile Home Park will negotiate the checks tendered by Mr. 
Peebles for monthly rent without prejudice to the rights of the 
parties. 
Should you have any questions, please advise. 
:y truly yours, 
/ 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
DKP:ec 
Enc. 
cc: Brookside Mobile Home Park 
